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opinion is not immediately obvious, as it contains elements of federalism, due process, and equal protection. 12 However, by extensively discussing the traditional state power over marriage, 13 and by describing New York's decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples as advancing the cause of equality, 14 the decision indicates to other states that they should likewise eliminate restrictions on same-sex marriage. If they do not, a close examination of the logic and reasoning of Windsor leads to the conclusion that future state and federal courts are likely to find that state same-sex marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional.
its decision), stayed by Order in Pending Case (573 U.S. August 20, 2014) , available at http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/14A196- McGuigg-v.-Bostic-Order .pdf#__utma=149406063.1720608795.1375172996.1408483621.1408585803.16&__utmb=14940 6063.8.10.1408585803&__utmc=149406063&__utmx=-&__utmz=149406063.1408481226 .14.1. utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none)&__utmv=-&__utmk=231044511); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014) (relying on Windsor and upholding district court's finding of unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban, but staying implementation of the decision until any appeal to the Supreme Court is decided), aff'g 962 F. Supp. Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 , 1038 -39 (N.J. 2013 ) (affirming the decision of the lower court that found New Jersey must allow same-sex marriage in light of the Windsor decision); see also Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973, 979-82, 984, 992, 995-96 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (relying on the reasoning in Windsor and finding that Ohio must recognize same-sex marriages performed outside the state); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173801, at *1-2, *7-9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013 ) (relying on Windsor and finding that same-sex couples in Illinois with terminal illnesses must be allowed to marry even before the Illinois marriage equality law comes into force because " [t] he putative subclass of medically critical plaintiffs here are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the provisions of the current Illinois law that deny them the right to marry based solely on their sexual orientation, as applied, violates their constitutional right to equal protection"); Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-cv-10285, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98382, at *2, *5-7 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2013) (denying a motion to dismiss in a case challenging Michigan's same-sex marriage ban because after Windsor, plaintiffs' claims have "plausibility").
12
See infra Part III (breaking the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor into five separate considerations).
13
See infra Part III.B (discussing the role federalism played in the Supreme Court's decision).
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Justice Ginsburg-one of the Justices signing on to the majority opinion in Windsor-has written that effective judicial decisions should "strive[] to persuade." 15 Furthermore, she wrote that "without taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain, the [Supreme] Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a green light for a social change." 16 The Supreme Court's decision in Windsor adheres to these ideals.
Part II of this Article describes the background to the Windsor case and its rise to the Supreme Court. 17 Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor, and the elements of federalism, due process, and equal protection present in the opinion. 18 Part IV of this Article applies the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor to future same-sex marriage cases involving challenges to state same-sex marriage prohibitions; it concludes that the Windsor decision should lead to courts finding that state prohibitions on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional, as has already begun to happen. 19 
II. WINDSOR'S JOURNEY TO THE SUPREME COURT
The Windsor case began when plaintiff Edith Windsor was assessed, and paid, more than $350,000 in federal income taxes that she would not have had to pay if her deceased spouse had been male instead of female. 20 Windsor sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging Section 3 of DOMA, 21 which provided that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 22 15 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185 REV. , 1186 REV. (1992 Id. at 1208.
17
See infra Part II (setting forth background information to the Windsor decision).
18
See infra Part III (analyzing the Windsor opinion).
19
See infra Part IV (describing how the decision in Windsor will affect future decisions of state and federal courts); see also supra note 11 (listing a number of court cases that have already found state same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional in light of Windsor). Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015] , Art. 7 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/7 2014] Is Full Marriage Equality for Windsor was validly married under New York state law, where she and her wife had resided at the time of her wife's death. 23 Windsor alleged that DOMA violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, applicable to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment, because it discriminated against her on the basis of sexual orientation. 24 The district court ruled for Windsor, found DOMA unconstitutional, and ordered that the federal government refund Windsor the tax money she had paid. 25 The district court found that DOMA discriminated based on sexual orientation and that DOMA was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 26 In making its determination, the court noted that it must perform a more thorough review under the rational basis test for laws that show "a desire to harm a politically unpopular group." 27 The district court declined to decide whether sexual orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny, as it found that the law could not even meet the more lenient rational basis test. 28 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but on slightly different grounds. 29 The Second Circuit found that sexual orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny and that DOMA could not pass heightened scrutiny. 30 The Second Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether DOMA could pass rational basis review, as it found heightened scrutiny applied and DOMA could not meet such scrutiny. 31 III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 32 However, the Court, like the district court, used rational basis review to reach this conclusion. 33 The Supreme Court also found that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 34 In the beginning of its opinion, the Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of federalism, 35 perhaps to obscure the logical conclusion that just as the federal same-sex marriage exclusion is unconstitutional, so too are the state same-sex marriage exclusions still present in most state law. The extensive discussion regarding state control over marriage also serves to encourage states that still prohibit same-sex marriage to change their laws. 36
A. The Tone of the Supreme Court's Decision
The tone of the Windsor opinion is persuasive, not combative. The Court seemed acutely aware that many people would be upset by, and disagree with, its decision. Thus, the Court bent over backwards to 32 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 , 2695 -96 (2013 ; see infra Part III.E (discussing the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis).
33
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 ("The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity."); see also supra text accompanying note 95 (explaining rational basis scrutiny).
34
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; see infra Part III.D (explaining that, although the Court did not identify the specific liberty interest at stake, prior cases suggest the Court likely found that DOMA infringed upon the fundamental right to marry). Nov. 14, 2013 , at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/hawaii-same-sex-marriage-becomes-law.html? _r=0 (noting Hawaii's decision to legalize same-sex marriage); Agurto, supra note 4 (explaining the effects of California's law legalizing same-sex marriage); supra note 11 and accompanying text (citing cases that have found same-sex marriage prohibitions invalid in light of Windsor).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015] , Art. 7 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/7 2014] Is Full Marriage Equality for show that it understood the sincere belief of those who believe marriage should only be between a man and a woman. It noted that "marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization." 37 The Court then used gentle persuasive language to explain why this old view is incorrect: "For others, however, came the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight. . . . The limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual couples . . . came to be seen in New York and certain other States as an unjust exclusion." 38 By using positive language to describe New York's decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples, the Court indirectly praised those states that have decided to permit same-sex marriage. The Court noted that when New York "used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation[ship]" to include samesex couples, its "decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of [same-sex couples] in their own community." 39 The Court explained that New York, by extending marriage to samesex couples, deemed their relationships "worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages." 40 This act "reflects both the community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality." 41 Furthermore, " [w] hen New York adopted a law to permit same-sex marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality." 42 The Court's intent in writing this type of description was most likely to encourage more states to join the twelve states and the District of Columbia that had already extended marriage rights to same-sex couples at the time Windsor was written. 43 If states voluntarily join New York in its quest to "eliminate inequality," 44 the Supreme Court will not have to force them to do so at a later date. 45 its opinion in Windsor would help turn the minority of states now permitting same-sex marriage into a majority. Then, when it does come time for the Supreme Court to pronounce that all states must allow same-sex marriage, the risk of great public outrage will be reduced, as the Court will not be overturning the law of most states. 46 
B. Federalism in the Supreme Court's Decision
The Court spent several pages describing how by history and tradition, marriage has been largely regulated by the states. 47 For example, the Court noted that "at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, [the states] possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the United States on the subject of marriage and divorce." 48 The Court recognized that in limited instances, such as determining what is a valid marriage for the purposes of immigration rights and determining who receives life insurance benefits under a federal program, the federal government may make laws that impact marriage. 49 However, the Court noted that whereas Congress may make these limited laws to further discrete federal policy concerning federal programs, DOMA's impact was much more far reaching than any other marriage-impacting Congressional act upheld by the Court. 50 Thus, upon a first reading of the Court's opinion, one may have been fooled into thinking that the Court was going to decide that the federal government, in enacting DOMA, had overstepped the constitutional division of power between federal and state governments. 51 This guess would have been bolstered by the fact that partway through its discussion on the extensive and traditional state power over marriage, the Court stated: "In order to assess the validity of [DOMA's] intervention it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition." 52 However, at the end of the Court's lengthy discussion on the traditional state power over marriage, the Court decided not to decide whether DOMA was unconstitutional as a violation of the balance of power 46 See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199 (noting that Supreme Court decisions that get too far ahead of public opinion risk a backlash against the judiciary).
47
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689-92. 48 Id. at 2691 (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49
Id. at 2690.
50
Id.
51
See id. (noting that DOMA has a very broad reach that affects a class of people that certain states enacted legislation to protect).
52
Id. at 2691.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015] 55 Thus, as discussed further below, the Court's lengthy discussion of federalism and the states' powers over marriage served simply to bolster its legal conclusion that DOMA violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. 56 However, as mentioned above, 57 the lengthy discussion on federalism may have been included by the Court for three other purposes: (1) to persuade the majority of states that still prohibit samesex marriage that they should use their historic power to change their laws and join New York in "eliminat[ing] inequality;" 58 (2) to obscure the fact that the Court's reasoning necessarily leads to the conclusion that state same-sex marriage prohibitions are also unconstitutional; and (3) to provide a basis for courts to distinguish Windsor when faced with future challenges to state same-sex marriage prohibitions. 59
C. The Supreme Court's Findings on DOMA's Purpose and Effect
After its extensive discussion on the federal division of power over marriage, the Court turned its attention to the purpose and effect of 53 Id. at 2692.
54
Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24, 635 (finding unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection a Colorado constitutional amendment forbidding any local law from protecting against sexual orientation discrimination because the law was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest).
56
See infra Part III.E (discussing the Supreme Court's findings on equal protection in relation to DOMA).
57
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (providing ideas as to why the Court discussed federalism at such length in Windsor); see also infra Part IV (analyzing the likely impact of Windsor on future cases). 704 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 DOMA. 60 Examining the history and the text of DOMA, the Court found that it was passed in order to "impose restrictions and disabilities," 61 "to injure," 62 to promote "traditional moral teachings," 63 "to discourage enactment of state same-sex marriage laws," 64 and to treat same-sex marriages recognized under state law "as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law." 65 The Court found the effects of DOMA were both financial and emotional. Among other things, DOMA prevented same-sex married couples and their families from obtaining healthcare and other benefits they would otherwise receive, and forced them to undergo a complicated procedure for filing taxes. 66 In addition, "DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others." 67 DOMA "humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples" and makes it "difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives." 68
D. The Supreme Court's Findings on Due Process
After discussing the purpose and effect of DOMA, the Court concluded that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because "the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage." 69 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 70 The Windsor Court did not discuss the reasoning behind its due process conclusion. However, an examination of the Court's prior due process cases reveals that the Windsor Court likely reasoned that DOMA impermissibly infringed upon the right to marry. In prior cases, the right to marry has Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015] 71 Under the substantive liberty protection afforded by the Due Process Clause, 72 before the government is permitted to infringe upon a fundamental liberty interest, it must demonstrate a compelling reason to do so. 73 Fundamental liberty rights have been described as those rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 74 However, the Supreme Court recently held that "[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." 75 In Lawrence v. Texas, 76 the Supreme Court found that a state could not criminalize private, consensual homosexual conduct, even though historically, non-procreative sexual activity was often criminalized. 77 The Court in Lawrence noted that "our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." 78 The Court reasoned that, examining the "laws and traditions in the past half century," there is "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 79 The Court then concluded that private, consensual, homosexual conduct should likewise be protected by the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause. 80 Thus, the very specific right in question, private homosexual conduct, need not have been protected since the nation's beginning in order to be protected as a fundamental liberty interest under the Due
71
See infra text accompanying notes 82-83 (discussing marriage as a fundamental right and explaining what that right encompasses).
72
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal government, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the states, shall be referred to interchangeably here as they both contain the same liberty and equal protection protections. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
73
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) The right to marry has been found by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental right protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause. 82 This right includes the right to marry and to choose one's marriage partner. 83 Thus, though it did not explicitly say so, it is likely that the Supreme Court in Windsor reasoned that DOMA violated the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause because it infringed the fundamental right to marry by demeaning the valid choices of marriage partner made by same-sex couples. This is so despite the fact that, like in Lawrence, the very specific right in question-in Lawrence, the right to engage in homosexual acts, 84 and in Windsor, the right to have one's same-sex marriage recognized 85 -has not been protected since the nation's beginning. Instead, the more general rights, the right to privacy in sex and the right to marry a person of one's choosing, have been protected and are developing in the nation's laws and traditions. 86 The Supreme Court found that the fundamental right to marry was implicated when it ruled that prison inmates have a right to marry, 87 that people behind in child support obligations have a right to marry, 88 and that interracial couples have a right to marry. 89 This was so despite the fact that the specific rights in question-to marry when in prison, to marry while behind in child support obligations, and to marry a person of a different race-have not been protected since the nation's beginning. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (recognizing protection for "adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex"); supra text accompanying notes 75-81 (discussing the Court's decision and rationale in Lawrence).
85
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682-83 (2013) (invalidating Section 3 of DOMA, "which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of 'spouse' as that term is used in federal statutes").
86
See supra text accompanying notes 81-83 (discussing the general liberty rights the Court has recognized to choose one's sexual and marriage partners).
87
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (holding that an almost complete ban on prisoners' right to marry was unconstitutional).
88
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 390-91 (1978) (finding that the statute limiting those behind in child support from marrying was unconstitutional).
89
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) .
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015] , Art. 7 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/7 2014] Is Full Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples Next? 707 same-sex couples sought to have their marriages recognized by the federal government, the fundamental right to marry was implicated, even though the specific right in question-federal recognition of samesex marriage-has not been protected since the nation's beginning.
Another possibility is that the Court simply found no rational basis for DOMA, and that in and of itself violated the liberty interest of the Fifth Amendment. At times, the Supreme Court has found that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause protects a person from arbitrary government interference with a person's liberty, even when that liberty interest is not fundamental. 90 However, this doctrine has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court in recent years, as it has been argued that it gives too much power to courts to invalidate legislation they do not agree with. 91 Thus, it is more likely that the Supreme Court in Windsor simply reasoned that DOMA impermissibly infringed upon Windsor's fundamental right to marry.
E. The Supreme Court's Findings on Equal Protection
Windsor alleged that "DOMA violate See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the substantive due process protection for non-fundamental liberty interests has fallen into "disrepute"); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-22 (explaining that requiring the presence of a "fundamental right" before determining whether the liberty element of due process has been violated "avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case").
92
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, includes the obligations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (explaining that although the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes an equal protection component and holding that racial segregation in public schools violates the Fifth Amendment by denying due process of law).
708 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, should be subject to heightened review under the equal protection guarantee. 93 Under current Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence, there are three tiers of scrutiny that apply to laws allocating different rights among individuals. 94 The most deferential level of scrutiny is "rational basis" scrutiny, which a challenged law can pass so long as it is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." 95 The other two types of scrutiny, "intermediate scrutiny" and "strict scrutiny," are collectively known as "heightened scrutiny." 96 Heightened scrutiny applies to discrimination on the basis of characteristics that require special protection, such as sex, illegitimacy, race, national origin, and alienage. 97 To pass heightened scrutiny, a law must either be substantially related to an important government interest-intermediate scrutiny 98 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 , 1315 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011 ). 97 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996 (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sex); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 264-65 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to a law that discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976) Id. at 2681 (indicating that the majority consisted of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); see id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion . . . the view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond mistaking by today's opinion."). Four Justices in Windsor would have found DOMA constitutional. Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and joined in part by Chief Justice Roberts, also authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Alito, joined in part by Justice Thomas, composed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting) .
115
Id. at 2692 (majority opinion). noting: its extensive discussion on how states traditionally have the power to decide who can marry supports rather than detracts from a state's decision to prohibit same-sex marriage; the Windsor Court specifically limited its holding to same-sex couples married under state law; 130 and the history and text of DOMA is necessarily different from a state's same-sex marriage prohibition because it is a different law. 131 However, many more courts facing future challenges to state samesex marriage prohibitions are likely to find that because Windsor held that DOMA's purpose and effect violates the equal protection and due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, so too do state-law same-sex marriage prohibitions, as a growing number of lower courts have already found. 132 The Supreme Court did not go so far as to say so in Windsor, probably in the hope of reducing rather than fueling controversy, 133 and in the hope of encouraging more states to legalize same-sex marriage on their own initiative.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Windsor is a seminal decision that gave hundreds of new rights to same-sex married couples. However, the Windsor opinion limits its holding to "those in lawful marriages" and so has no immediate effect on the laws of the more than thirty states where same-sex marriage is still prohibited. Nonetheless, this Article has shown that the opinion in Windsor paves the way for more same-sex couples to be able to marry in the future by: encouraging more states to voluntarily extend marriage rights to same-sex couples; and making it more likely that courts in future cases will decide that state same-sex marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional.
130
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
131
See id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the "statute-specific considerations" discussed in the majority opinion "will . . . be irrelevant in future cases about different statutes").
132
See supra Part IV.A (discussing Windsor's application in future same-sex marriage cases). A growing number of courts have already used Windsor's reasoning to find invalid state same-sex marriage prohibitions and other state laws. See cases cited supra note 11 (providing recent cases in which courts have relied on Windsor to find same-sex marriage prohibitions invalid in their respective jurisdictions).
133
See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199 (explaining that to "reduce rather than to fuel controversy," the Court should refrain from doing more than necessary to decide the constitutionality of a case).
